








98-28-BThe Wharton Financial Institutions Center
The Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to
the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for competitive
excellence.  The Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk at the firm level
as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.
The Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.
candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center.  The
Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is
informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as they
pursue competitive excellence.
Copies of the working papers summarized here are available from the Center.  If you would like
to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research community, please let us
know of your interest.
Anthony M. Santomero
Director
The Working Paper Series is made possible by a generous
grant from the Alfred P. Sloan FoundationAn Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency 
†
David B. Gross Nicholas S. Souleles
Graduate School of Business Finance Department




This paper uses a unique new panel data set of credit card accounts to analyze credit card
delinquency and more generally personal bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models. We
estimate duration models for default and assess the relative importance of different variables in
predicting default. We investigate how the propensity to default has changed over time,
disentangling the two leading explanations for the recent increase in default rates – a deterioration
in the risk-composition of borrowers versus a reduction in the social stigma of default. Even after
controlling for risk-composition and other economic fundamentals, the propensity to default
significantly increased between 1995 and 1997. By contrast, increases in credit limits and other
changes in risk-composition explain only a small part of the change in default rates. Standard
default models appear to have missed an important time-varying default factor, consistent with the
stigma effect.
JEL classification: E21; E51; G21; G33
Keywords: Personal bankruptcy; Forecasting default; Credit risk management; Consumer credit;
        Credit cards
                                                            
† We would like to thank Andy Abel, Jason Abrevaya, Franklin Allen, Larry Ausubel, Chris Carroll, Gary Gorton, Jon
Gruber, Anil Kashyap, Olivia Mitchell, David Musto, Tony Santomero, Todd Sinai, Alwyn Young, and seminar
participants at Columbia, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, NYU, Maryland, Northwestern, the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, M.I.T., Brown, the NBER Summer Institute, and various workshops at the University of Chicago
GSB and The Wharton School. We are grateful to the Wharton Financial Institutions Center and several credit card
issuers for numerous discussions and assistance in acquiring the data. All remaining errors are our own.An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency
Abstract
This paper uses a unique new panel data set of credit card accounts to analyze credit card
delinquency and more generally personal bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models. We
estimate duration models for default and assess the relative importance of different variables in
predicting default. We investigate how the propensity to default has changed over time,
disentangling the two leading explanations for the recent increase in default rates – a deterioration
in the risk-composition of borrowers versus a reduction in the social stigma of default. Even after
controlling for risk-composition and other economic fundamentals, the propensity to default
significantly increased between 1995 and 1997. By contrast, increases in credit limits and other
changes in risk-composition explain only a small part of the change in default rates. Standard
default models appear to have missed an important time-varying default factor, consistent with the
stigma effect.
JEL classification: E21; E51; G21; G33
Keywords: Personal bankruptcy; Forecasting default; Credit risk management; Consumer credit;
        Credit cards1
1.  Introduction
Debt issued by consumers is an under-studied asset class. There has been particularly little
study of recent trends in default on this debt. Between 1994 and 1997 the number of personal
bankruptcy filings in the U.S. rose by about 75%. The 1.35 million filings in 1997 represented
well over 1% of U.S. households. Delinquency rates on credit cards rose almost as sharply.
(Federal Reserve Board of Cleveland, 1998)  The resulting losses to lenders amounted to a
sizeable fraction of the interest payments they collect, potentially raising the average cost of
credit. These trends in default, both in bankruptcy and delinquency, are especially surprising in
light of the strong economy over the period. They provide an unusually rich source of variation to
test the stability of models that forecast personal default and of credit risk models more generally.
There are two leading explanations given for these trends. First, the risk-composition of
borrowers might have worsened. Under the “risk effect,” less credit-worthy borrowers obtained
additional credit in recent years, and it is these borrowers who accounted for most of the rise in
default. In particular, many analysts cite growth in the number of credit card offers and in the
sizes of credit card lines as the most important factors behind the rise in default. (See e.g. the New
York Times, 1998.)
The second explanation is that there might have been a decline in the social stigma
associated with default or an increase in knowledge about default. Stigma can be thought of as
part of the cost of default, both non-pecuniary (e.g., disgrace) and pecuniary (e.g., the
consequences of a bad reputation). Many analysts argue that these costs have recently declined,
especially as default has become more commonplace. Default, in particular filing for bankruptcy,
also entails information and legal costs, which might likewise have declined. Here analysts often
cite growth in the number of bankruptcy lawyers and their advertising (as prohibitions on2
advertising were loosened), as well as in other sources of advice like “how-to-file” books.
Further, the flow of informal advice from family and friends might have accelerated as more
people have been through bankruptcy.
1 Even a small decline in these various costs could
substantially increase default rates, considering White (1997)’s estimate that between 15% and
31% of U.S. households could benefit, just in terms of their current net worth, by filing for
bankruptcy. Generalizing these arguments, by the “stigma effect” we mean quite broadly that
people have become more willing to default over time, even controlling for their risk
characteristics and other standard economic fundamentals.
It can be important to determine the relative significance of these two alternative
explanations. Unlike the risk effect the stigma effect represents a change in the relationship
between default and the economic fundamentals that lenders typically use to predict default, such
as debt levels.  Their default forecasting models would then be missing some systematic and time-
varying factor, and hence be unstable. This could potentially result in the misallocation or
mispricing of credit.  Unlike a deliberate expansion in the supply of credit, an unexpected decline
in stigma would lead to greater credit losses than expected.  While lenders can respond to
increased losses from either effect by improving the risk-composition of their portfolios, a broad-
based decline in stigma might require more substantial changes in credit policy. As regards public
policy, some policy makers subscribing to the risk effect have advocated restricting credit supply
in order to improve the risk-composition of the borrowing population. Others, subscribing to the
                                                            
1 Weller (1998) provides a typical exposition of these arguments: "Just as attorney advertising has enhanced the public's
awareness of bankruptcy as a financial escape hatch and bankruptcy reform has made filing less time consuming than
renewing a driver's license, the stigma of bankruptcy has become a shadow of its former self. The names of good
bankruptcy attorneys and stories about the ease of getting out of debt are passed around the water cooler like football
scores on a Monday morning in October."3
stigma effect, have advocated making the terms of bankruptcy less attractive in order to increase
the perceived costs of default.
Unfortunately it has been difficult to disentangle the risk and stigma effects empirically.
First, it is not obvious how to operationalize the stigma effect. Most of the proxies for stigma that
have been suggested run into problems of endogeneity and reverse causality.
2 A second difficulty
is that controlling for risk-composition requires measures of credit supply and credit risk for a
large sample of borrowers, including a large number of borrowers who have defaulted. As in the
literature on corporate default, traditional household data sets do not provide enough such
information.
This paper uses a new data set containing a panel of several hundred thousand individual
credit card accounts from several different credit card issuers. The data set is of very high quality.
It includes essentially everything that the issuers know about their accounts, including information
from individuals’ credit applications, monthly statements, and credit bureau reports. In particular,
the data set records cardholder default (both delinquency and bankruptcy) and contains a rich set
of measures of credit risk including debt levels, purchase and payment histories, credit lines, and
credit risk scores, the issuers’ own internal summary statistics for risk.
We use this data to analyze credit card delinquency and more broadly personal bankruptcy
and the stability of credit risk models.  Aggregate credit card debt currently amounts to over $500
billion, much of which is securitized, so credit card default is of interest in itself.  Further, because
about 75% of U.S. households hold credit cards, and our data set includes credit bureau data
which pertains to all sources of consumer credit, not just credit cards, we are able to study
                                                            
2 For example, consider using the number of advertisements by bankruptcy lawyers as an inverse proxy for stigma. The
problem is that an increase in ads might not be the cause of the rise in bankruptcies, but rather their effect. The increased4
personal bankruptcy and default in general. Total consumer debt amounts to about $6T, $1.3T
even excluding mortgages (Federal Reserve System, 1999). Relative to the assets side of
household balance sheets, there has been surprisingly little analysis to date of the liabilities side,
largely for lack of data.  Finally, empirical models of personal and corporate default are in many
ways analogous. On the corporate side, Saunders (1999) emphasizes the same two difficulties
discussed above: the paucity of data, especially the limited number of observations of default; and
the potential instability of default models over time, especially over the business cycle.  In
contrast, our data allows us to study a large number of defaulters over a concentrated sample
period, 1995-1997, of benign macro-economic conditions.  Finding model instability in such a
sample would be a relatively strong result.
Specifically, we estimate duration models for default, for both bankruptcy and credit card
delinquency, and assess the relative importance of different variables in predicting default. The
estimated models allow us, for example, to evaluate the quality of commercial credit scores as
predictors of bankruptcy or delinquency. Are the scores optimal predictors of default,
incorporating all information available to the issuers? In addition, are younger accounts and
accounts with larger credit lines more likely to default? We also investigate how the propensity to
default has changed over time, disentangling the risk and stigma effects. Since the data include the
information that the card issuers themselves use to measure risk, we are able to control for all
changes in the risk-composition of accounts that were observable by the issuers. This allows us to
assess the stability of default models from the point of view of a lender trying to forecast default.
A key finding is that the relation between default and economic fundamentals appears to
have substantially changed over the sample period. Even after controlling for risk-composition
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
bankruptcies could be due to the risk effect, with lawyers responding to the increased demand for their services by5
and other standard economic variables, the propensity to default significantly increased between
1995 and 1997. A credit card holder in 1997 was almost 1 percentage point more likely to declare
bankruptcy and 4 percentage points more likely to go delinquent than a cardholder with identical
risk characteristics in 1995. These magnitudes are approximately as large as if the entire
population of cardholders had become one standard deviation riskier, as measured by credit risk
scores. By contrast, increases in credit limits and other changes in risk-composition explain only
small part of the change in default rates over time. Standard default models appear to have missed
an important, systematic and time-varying default factor, consistent with the stigma effect.
Section 2 of the paper describes the data used in the analysis and Section 3 discusses
related studies. Section 4 develops the econometric methodology and Section 5 reports the
results. Conclusions appear in Section 6. 
2.  Data description
The authors have assembled a panel data set of several hundred thousand credit card
accounts from several different credit card issuers. The accounts are representative of all open
accounts in 1995. Because the issuers include some of the largest credit card companies in the
U.S., the data should be generally representative of credit card accounts in the U.S. in 1995.
3 The
individual accounts are then followed monthly for 24 to 32 months. Different credit card issuers
track somewhat different sets of variables at different frequencies depending on whether the
variables come from cardholders’ monthly statements, credit bureau reports, or credit
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
additional advertising.6
applications. To protect the identity of the accounts and the issuers, the data from different issuers
were pooled together, with great care taken to define variables consistently across issuers. The
results that are reported will only use variables common to all the issuers. However, the results
were checked for robustness separately for each issuer, using that issuer’s complete set of
variables. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the main set of variables used below.
This data has a number of unique advantages compared to traditional household data sets
like the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) or the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
First, the large cross-section of accounts contains many thousands of observations of even low
probability events like delinquency and bankruptcy. Second, the long time series makes it possible
to estimate explicitly dynamic models of default. Third, in contrast to data based on surveys of
households, measurement error is much less of a problem. Fourth, the data contains essentially all
the variables used by issuers in evaluating accounts. Using account data does, however, entail a
number of limitations. The main unit of analysis in the data is a credit card account, not an
individual. We partially circumvent this limitation by using data from the credit bureaus, which
cover all sources of credit used by the cardholder, and by examining credit card delinquency in
addition to bankruptcy. Also, there is little information about some potentially important variables
like household assets or employment status. However the study by Fay, Hurst, and White (1998)
discussed below finds that the effects of such variables on bankruptcy are relatively small in
magnitude.
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
3 As a check, the data were benchmarked against the more limited and self-reported credit card information in the 1995
Survey of Consumer Finances. The averages of most variables were in rough agreement, however preliminary analysis
suggests that the SCF households underreport the amount of debt they actually rollover.7
3.  Related studies
Most empirical studies of default have focused on bankruptcy, concentrating on the effect
of changes in the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 or on the effects of different exemption levels on filing
rates across U.S. states. (For a review see Hynes, 1998.) These studies have generally used
aggregated data, and hence do not address the role of risk-composition.
In their historical discussion of bankruptcy, Moss and Johnson (1998) note that the stigma
effect has been proposed in the past to explain previous accelerations in bankruptcy rates, as in
the 1920s and 1960s. In the absence of evidence, they warn against simply assuming the stigma
effect is playing an important role today. Instead, they argue that increases over time in the
amount of debt held by lower income households can potentially explain the recent rise in
bankruptcy. This argument is a version of the risk-composition effect. Unfortunately the SCF,
which Moss and Johnson use to identify the change in the distribution of debt, does not record
whether people have filed for bankruptcy so they are unable to test their argument empirically.
Since there have been changes in the income distribution of credit in the past, it does not follow
that recent changes in the distribution explain current bankruptcy trends. The relative importance
of risk-composition versus stigma is a quantitative question that can only be answered with
suitable data.
Domowitz and Sartain (1999) try to circumvent the limitations of the SCF by combining it
with a separate data set of bankruptcy petitions. They use this additional data essentially to
estimate whether the households in the 1983 SCF have filed for bankruptcy. However, it can be
difficult to estimate low-probability events like bankruptcy in a small, cross-sectional sample like8
the SCF.
4 The 1996 PSID contained a set of retrospective questions about bankruptcy. Fay,
Hurst, and White (1998) use this data to try to identify the effects of stigma. Because the PSID
also recorded data on household balance sheets in a number of years (1984, 1989, and 1994), the
authors were able to estimate for each household in their sample the economic benefit of filing for
Chapter 7, taken to be the value of debt that would be discharged minus assets (net of exemption
levels) that would be relinquished. As an inverse proxy for stigma, the authors use the lagged
bankruptcy rate in the state in which the household resides. They find that the probability of filing
increases with both the economic benefit of filing and the inverse proxy for stigma. However, the
magnitude of the increase is small in both cases. This paper differs from the Fay, Hurst, and White
study in a number of ways. First, their PSID sample contains only about 250 observations of
bankruptcy over the course of a 12 year period ending in 1995. Non-linear inference on such a
small sample of households can be difficult.
5 Second, the PSID does not contain explicit measures
of household credit risk like risk scores, nor measures of credit supply like credit lines.
The related literature on corporate default is much larger, though as already noted it too
has been constrained by data limitations. Also, as Shumway (1998) emphasizes, much of the
literature has used essentially static, cross-sectional specifications for default.  By contrast the
duration analysis used here will explicitly accommodate changes over time in the riskiness of a
given borrower.
                                                            
4To illustrate, the SCF sub-sample used in their analysis contains about 1,900 households. Even at today’s bankruptcy
rate of approximately 1%, which is much larger than the 1983 rate, the sub-sample would include only about 19
households that actually filed for bankruptcy.
5 Fay, Hurst, and White estimate that their PSID households underreported the incidence of bankruptcy by about 50%,
relative to aggregate statistics.9
4.  Econometric methodology
From the data set described in Section 2, we drew a representative sample of all credit
card accounts open as of June 1995. This sample includes all accounts in good standing as of that
month. Accounts that had been closed or frozen on or before June 1995 because they were
bankrupt or three or more cycles delinquent are excluded.
6 These accounts were followed for the
next 24 months, or until they first defaulted. This period from 1995:Q3 through 1997:Q4 covers
the time of the sharp rise in default at the national level. Two indicator variables were created that
identify the first month in the sample, if any, in which an account defaulted. The delinquency
indicator, DEL, identifies the first time that a card failed to meet its minimum payment for three
successive months, the standard industry definition of serious delinquency. The bankruptcy
indicator, BK, identifies the month in which the card issuer was notified or learned from the credit
bureaus that the cardholder filed for bankruptcy. Accounts that are both delinquent and bankrupt
are counted as bankrupt. This yields about four thousand accounts going bankrupt, and fourteen
thousand accounts going delinquent. A random sample of about ten thousand accounts that never
default within the sample period is included as a control group. The delinquent and the bankrupt
accounts are each separately compared to the non-default control group. The resulting samples
overweight defaulting accounts, in predetermined proportions, in order to increase precision.  All
the results below are weighted to make them representative. 
We shall estimate dynamic probit models for default, which on our samples are equivalent
to discrete duration models. (See Shumway, 1998, for a helpful discussion of this equivalence.)
                                                            
6 To simplify the analysis of the age of a credit card account below, the main analysis does not include accounts opened
before 1990. Given the recent growth in the number of accounts, this restriction retains most accounts. The conclusions
below are unaffected whether or not these older cards are included.10
For either the delinquency or bankruptcy sample, let Di,t indicate whether account i defaulted in
month t. For instance an account which goes three cycles delinquent in month 10 would have
Dit=0 for the first 9 months,  Di,10=1, and then drop out of the sample. Let 
*
,t i D  be the
corresponding latent index value. The main specification that will be estimated is given by
equation (1):
t i t i D ,
*
, h + ¢ + ¢ + ¢ + ¢ = t i, 3 t i, 2 t i, 1 t 0 econ b risk b age b time b . (1)
agei,t represents the number of months that account i has been open by time t. This variable allows
for “seasoning” of credit card accounts, e.g. accounts might become less likely to default as they
age.  Under the duration model interpretation of Eq. (1), it is agei,t that captures the duration
dependence in default. The vector agei,t represents a fifth-order polynomial in account age, to
allow the associated hazard function to vary non-parametrically.  riski,t and  econi,t represent
account-specific measures of risk and local economic conditions, respectively, and will be further
described below. The time dummies, corresponding to calendar quarters, allow for shifts over
time in the average propensity to default, for accounts of any age and risk characteristics and
controlling for economic conditions. They capture other time-varying default factors.
It will be helpful to begin with a simpler specification.  A probit model of delinquency was
first estimated with only the time dummies and the fifth-order polynomial in account age as the
independent variables, omitting riski,t and econi,t. Fig. 1 displays the resulting predicted values.
Each curve shows the effect of account age on delinquency, the non-parametric hazard function,
for a different quarter. The age variables are statistically significant and large in magnitude.  The
inverted-U shape implies that the probability of delinquency rises from the time an account is
booked until about its two-year birthday, and then declines. The time dummies are also11
significant, implying that the hazard functions shifted over time, and so the simple specification is
unstable.
These shifts could reflect changes in the risk-composition of accounts or in other
economic fundamentals over time.  Eq. (1) controls for such changes.  The available risk measures
riski,t are quite comprehensive. They include direct, monthly observations of the performance of
each account, such as debt levels, purchase and payment histories, and credit lines, as well as the
credit risk scores, the issuers’ own overall summary of the riskiness of each account. We will
assess the relative importance of these variables in predicting default. Note that if the credit scores
are sufficient statistics for default, no other variables available to the issuers should be significant
predictors.  econi,t controls for local economic conditions like the state unemployment rate
(unemployment), the fraction of people in the state without health insurance (no_insurance), and
the median real new house price in the region (house_prices). While unemployment is available
monthly, house_prices is measured quarterly and no_insurance only annually. Monthly values for
the latter two variables were linearly interpolated.
The age polynomial and the risk variables together control for the risk-composition of
credit card accounts and therefore for the risk effect. If lending standards were loosened over
time, recently booked accounts will have worse risk characteristics, and under the risk effect this
would explain the rise in default. The time dummies identify changes over time in the average
propensity to default that are not due to risk-composition or other economic fundamentals, and so
capture omitted factors like stigma. It is of course possible that the time effects we identify with
stigma are picking up some other measure of risk or other economic fundamental that we have
not controlled for. However, Eq. (1) already contains a much richer set of controls than is
available in the data used in previous studies. The controls used here include the variables tracked12
by the credit card issuers themselves, who have strong incentives to measure risk accurately.
Further, in light of the strength of the economy in recent years, most other unmeasured economic
fundamentals improved over the sample period and therefore would be unlikely to increase default
rates.
There are multiple possible timing conventions that could be used for the risk controls
riski,t in Eq. (1). To identify changes in booking standards over time, they might naturally be taken
from the original time of application. However, application data would not control for changes in
risk-composition or economic conditions between the time of application and the start of the
sample. For example, the 1990-91 recession might have had lingering effects on people’s ability to
pay their debts. Taking the risk controls from the time of application would attribute all of this
variation to stigma. Also, some issuers did not store some of their application variables, especially
for the older accounts.
Instead, for the main results the risk controls are all taken from June 1995, the month
before the start of the sample period (that is, month t=0). While agei,t controls for the variable
component of account risk, namely the baseline hazard function, riski,0 controls for the fixed
component. It allows the hazard function to vary across accounts that start the sample period with
different risk characteristics. To test for the risk effect, we will essentially check whether the
sample trends in default can be explained by riskier accounts progressing through the riskier parts
of their life cycle (e.g., around their two-year birthday). For instance, suppose the youngest
accounts in the sample, those opened in early 1995, have bad risk characteristics riski,0.  Then the
default rate might have increased in 1997 because the risky (and relatively large) 1995 “cohort” of
accounts hit its two-year birthday in 1997. By contrast, to test for the stigma effect, we will check
whether all accounts – even accounts with the same risk characteristics, age, and other economic13
fundamentals – have become more likely to default over time. Using riski,0 is also appropriate
from the point of view of a lender (or investor) who at time 0 is trying to forecast future default
rates in a portfolio. Forecasting over a two-year horizon is consistent with industry practice; in
particular the credit risk scores are usually calibrated on two-year samples.
Another possible timing convention would be to use updated, contemporary risk controls,
riski,t. But updating the risk controls would confound the risk and stigma effects because many of
the risk variables are under the direct control of the consumer. For instance, people could have
chosen to take on more debt over the course of the sample period because the stigma of default
has fallen. Using riski,t would attribute all of this variation to the risk effect, thereby understating
the stigma effect. One of the variables in riski,t, however, is directly under the control of the
issuers, namely the credit line. Therefore we sometimes replace the initial line, linei,0, with the
updated line, linei,t, keeping the other, demand-determined risk controls at their initial values. This
allows us to test whether increases in credit lines – the intensive margin of credit supply – have
contributed to the default rate during the sample period.
7
Aggregate credit supply during the sample period also changed along the extensive
margin, through the introduction of new accounts. Since our sample is representative of accounts
already open in mid 1995, it does not include accounts that opened subsequently. Hence the
results do not include the contribution of these youngest accounts to national default rates
between mid 1995 and mid 1997. However, this is not a problem for our analysis. The stigma
effect should be independent of the characteristics of individual accounts, and the results will fully
                                                            
7 Of course, the issuers endogenously choose the credit lines on the basis of cardholders’ past behavior, so using even
the updated line could understate the stigma effect. In a companion paper, Gross and Souleles (1999), we explicitly
examine the endogeneity in the supply of credit, and cardholder response to changes in supply. Note that under any of
the timing conventions, the risk controls incorporate some supply effects (e.g., issuers’ decisions to offer credit to14
capture the contribution of the risk-composition of the accounts that are in the sample, to the
default rates in the sample.
Both dynamic probit and logit models of Eq. (1) were estimated. Because the results were
both qualitatively and quantitatively similar, we report only the probit results. The standard errors
allow for heteroscedasticity across accounts as well as dependence within accounts. Dummy
variables for the issuers are included but not reported. Various extensions of Eq. (1) will also be
considered.
In order to evaluate how changes in stigma and risk-composition affect the probability of
default, we want to compute the marginal value of varying each effect independently, at different
times in the sample period. This requires a generalization of the marginal effects that are usually












be the cross-sectional mean of x in quarter t. We can naturally define the marginal
effect of changing stigma to be the effect on default rates of varying only the time dummies,
holding all other variables in Eq. (1) equal to their cross-sectional means. As a baseline, marginal
values will be calculated relative to the first quarter (1995:Q3). Thus, the marginal effect of the
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different risk groups) and some demand effects (e.g., people’s decisions to open accounts and how much to borrow).
Thus, the estimated risk effect represents an upper bound on the effects of issuer supply decisions.15
Symmetrically, we define the marginal effect of changing risk-composition over time to be the
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Standard errors for stigmat and riskcompt are calculated using the delta method.
It is important to understand exactly what riskcompt measures. First, to emphasize the
difference between changes in stigma and changes in standard economic fundamentals, we include
in riskcomp the effects of changes in economic conditions, by varying econ. Second, since riski,0
identifies the fixed component of each account’s risk, it does not contribute to variation in risk-
composition over the sample period. As a result in the baseline specification the changes in
riskcompt over time are all due to changes in the variable, hazard-rate component of risk-
composition, agei,t, and in econi,t. Once we have used riski,0 to control for the fixed component of
account risk, our identification scheme allows us to treat the marginal effects of risk and stigma
symmetrically, by using agei,t to control for changes in risk over time, and timet to measure
changes in stigma over time. For a given risk group, identified by the account-specific measures of
risk in riski,0, both time and age are allowed to have a non-parametric effect on the probability of
default over time.16
5.  Results
The first column of Table 2 shows the baseline results from the probit model for
bankruptcy. The estimated coefficients for the quarter dummies and age polynomial are followed
by the coefficients for the risk controls and local economic conditions. Starting at the bottom of
the column, the unemployment rate unemployment and house prices house_prices are significant
with the expected signs:  greater unemployment and weaker house prices are associated with
more bankruptcies. The risk controls are jointly very significant. Because the credit scores are
important summary statistics for risk, both their levels and squares are included. Two different
scores are used. The internal risk score is based on the past behavior of the individual account, the
external risk score from the credit bureaus is based on the behavior of the account holder across
all sources of credit. For each score the linear and quadratic terms are together quite significant,
with c
2
(2) statistics of around 100. Their total effect has the expected sign:  accounts with higher
scores are much less likely to go bankrupt. The remaining risk controls include card balances,
payments, and purchases all normalized by the credit line, and the line itself. The normalized
balance, defined as the utilization rate, is specified as a series of dummy variables: utilization1 to
utilization7 represent a utilization rate of 0, in (0,0.4], (0.4,0.7], (0.7,0.8], (0.8,0.9], and
(0.9,1.0], and over 1.0, respectively. Not surprisingly, accounts with higher utilization rates are
much more likely to go bankrupt. Accounts making smaller payments or larger purchases also go
bankrupt more often, although the latter effect is not significant. Since variables other than the
credit scores are statistically significant, the scores appear not to be optimal predictors of default.
The coefficient on the line is insignificant, but will be discussed further below, along with17
additional risk controls. The age variables remain jointly significant although the associated age
hazard function is less sharply peaked than in Fig. 1.
The coefficients for the time dummies are highly significant and increase almost
monotonically. Thus, even after controlling for account age, balance, purchase and payment
history, credit line, risk scores, and economic conditions, a given account was more likely to go
bankrupt in 1996 and 1997 than in 1995. Some other systematic default factor must have
deteriorated, consistent with the stigma effect.
To quantify the relative importance of the risk and stigma effects over time, we computed
their marginal values, riskcompt and stigmat, for each quarter. The results appear in Column (1) of
Table 3, and are graphed in Fig. 2. riskcompt is initially flat and then declines. As expected the
aging of the portfolio and improvements in economic conditions imply a decrease in the
bankruptcy rate over time. The time dummies essentially capture the difference between this
implied bankruptcy rate and the actual rate. The rising trend in stigmat suggests that the actual
rate is increasingly larger than the implied rate. The magnitudes are much larger than for
riskcompt and are statistically and economically significant. The probability of bankruptcy in
quarter eight is about 0.07 percentage points per month larger than at the start of the sample. At
an annual rate this translates into almost a 1 percentage point increase in the bankruptcy rate, a
substantial effect.
Another way to illustrate the magnitude of the stigma effect is to contrast it with the effect
of increasing the risk score of every account in the data by one standard deviation. This represents
a very large increase in the overall riskiness of the credit card portfolio. A one standard deviation
increase in the internal risk score raises the average probability of bankruptcy by about 0.07
percentage points per month, approximately the peak value of stigmat in quarter eight. Thus, the18
estimated stigma effect increased the bankruptcy rate by about as much as had the entire portfolio
become one standard deviation riskier – again a substantial effect. We similarly computed the
effects of varying other risk controls. The values for stigma are always large in comparison.
The remaining columns of Table 2 present various extensions of this analysis for
bankruptcy. The associated marginal effects appear in the corresponding columns in Table 3.
Column (2) shows the effects of interacting the age polynomial with all of the risk controls riski,0.
This interaction allows the baseline hazard functions to have very different shapes across different
risk groups. Table 2 shows the resulting coefficients on the primary, non-interacted variables. The
interaction terms are significant for payments, purchases, and the two risk scores. In Table 3 the
associated marginal values stigmat in Column (2) have decreased by about one-third in magnitude
relative to baseline Column (1), but they remain significant and continue to rise over time. The
marginal values riskcompt now rise until quarter 4 but then decline.
Column (3) in Tables 2 and 3 shows the results using the updated credit limit (once
lagged), linei,t-1, to investigate the effects of changes in credit supply within the sample period.
The other, demand-determined risk controls are maintained at their initial values. The coefficient
on the credit line is significant at the 10% level but negative, implying that larger lines are
associated with less default. This reflects the fact that issuers offered greater amounts of credit to
the cardholders that they believed to be less risky. The coefficients on the time dummies and their
marginal values stigmat do not change very much. These findings suggest that larger credit lines
are not responsible for the recent rise in default.
Column (4) adds dummy variables for the state in which the cardholder resides.  These
variables control for fixed geographical effects on the propensity to default. For instance,
additional credit might have recently been obtained by riskier households living in poorer states.19
Similarly, regulations, judicial attitudes, and average household demographics differ across states.
However, while the state dummies are jointly quite significant (not shown), they do not much
change the pattern of results for stigmat. A conditional logit model was also estimated to remove
fixed effects by zip code, but did not change these conclusions.
As discussed above, it is difficult to operationalize more directly the various notions of
stigma that have been proposed.  Some of these emphasize the idea that social opprobrium and
information about bankruptcy might change with the number of people in one's community,
appropriately defined, that have already filed for bankruptcy. To operationalize this geographic
view of stigma we use the aggregate bankruptcy rate in the state in which the cardholder resides,
the smallest geographic unit for which data is available.  We add to Eq. (1) the average of this rate
over the previous two calendar quarters, denoted by  stateratet-1. As reported in Column (5),
stateratet-1 is statistically significant and its total effect is positive, as expected.  The probability
someone files for bankruptcy increases with the number of people in her state who filed in the
recent past. Further, the marginal values stigmat have decreased to about 60% of their baseline
values in Column (1).  These results support the geographic view of stigma. The omitted default
factor varies systematically across states.  Of course, the relevant community within which stigma
operates might not be one's state, so these results can be considered a lower bound for the effect
of stigma.
The same analysis was undertaken using delinquency as the indicator of default. Tables 4
and 5 present the results for the different specifications and their corresponding marginal values.
In the baseline specification, in Column (1), the pattern of coefficients on the risk controls is
similar to that above for bankruptcy. Now  no_insurance is significant, with lack of health
insurance associated with more delinquency. Once again people with larger balances and lower20
risk scores are much more likely to default. (The linear and quadratic terms for the external score
are jointly significant.) Even with these controls for risk, the coefficients on the time dummies are
again highly significant. Fig. 3 graphs the corresponding marginal values. stigmat rises for six
quarters, but unlike for bankruptcy it then plateaus. (The magnitudes are larger than in Fig. 2 for
bankruptcy, but this is because delinquency is much more common than bankruptcy.) The peak
value in quarter six of about 0.3 translates into almost a 4 percentage point increase in the annual
delinquency rate. For comparison, increasing the internal risk scores by one standard deviation
raises the average predicted probability of delinquency by about 0.5 percentage points, more than
the peak value of stigmat. In this sense too the stigma effect is weaker for delinquency than for
bankruptcy.
The remaining columns in Tables 4 and 5 presents various extensions. Column (2) shows
the results on interacting age with riski,0. This time the interaction terms for payments and the
scores are significant. Again the time dummies remain significant and retain their original pattern,
although their marginal values stigmat have been reduced by about 20% in magnitude. In Column
(3) the updated credit line linei,t-1 is again negative and highly significant. Finally, adding state
dummies does not change these conclusions, as reported in Column (4).
For both bankruptcy and delinquency, some additional risk controls were added to Eq.
(1), in subsamples where they are available. These variables include the income and age (date of
birth) of the cardholder, and credit bureau variables like the total number of bankcards held by the
cardholder and total debt from all sources normalized by income. While such variables are
generally significant in predicting default, the coefficients on the time dummies always remain
significant and increasing (unreported). It appears that there has not been enough change in risk-21
composition to explain the variation in default rates over the sample period. This is consistent
with the stigma effect.
6.  Conclusion
This paper has used a unique new panel data set of credit card accounts to analyze credit
card delinquency and more generally personal bankruptcy and the stability of credit risk models.
We estimated duration models for consumer default and assessed the relative importance of
different variables in predicting default. We also investigated how the propensity to default has
changed over time, disentangling the two leading explanations for the recent increase in default –
changes in risk-composition and reductions in stigma. Our data contains a much richer set of
measures of risk-composition than previously available, including debt levels, purchase and
payment histories, credit lines, and credit risk scores. Since these measures include the
information that credit card issuers themselves use to measure risk, we were able to control for all
changes in risk-composition that were observable by or deliberately induced by the issuers,
including increases in credit lines. The risk controls are highly significant in predicting default.
Accounts with lower credit scores were much more likely to default.  Even controlling for the
scores, accounts with larger balances and purchases, or smaller payments, were also more likely
to default.  Unemployment, weak house prices, and lack of health insurance were also associated
with more default.  Larger credit lines however were not associated with default, suggesting that
issuers extended the larger lines to less risky accounts. Nonetheless, despite their significance
these variables explain only a small part of the change in bankruptcy and delinquency rates over22
the sample period. In sum, neither the risk-composition of accounts nor economic conditions
changed enough to explain default rates.
Instead, the relation between default and economic fundamentals appears to have
substantially changed over the period. Even after controlling for risk-composition and other
economic fundamentals, the propensity to default significantly increased between mid 1995 and
mid 1997. A credit card holder in 1997 was almost 1 percentage point more likely to declare
bankruptcy and 4 percentage points more likely to go delinquent than a cardholder with identical
risk characteristics in 1995. These magnitudes are approximately as large as if the entire
population of cardholders had become one standard deviation riskier, as measured by risk scores.
Standard default models appear to have missed an important, systematic and time-varying default
factor. Because this factor is not explained by our very rich set of controls for economic
fundamentals, and it increases with the number of people in one's state who have previously filed
for bankruptcy, these results are consistent with the stigma effect.
Our analysis does not identify what caused the estimated change in stigma. Indeed, the
stigma and risk effects can be interrelated. It is possible, for instance, that a previous deterioration
in risk-composition or economic fundamentals caused a critical mass of people to declare
bankruptcy, leading in turn to the reduction in stigma that we observe. This suggests the
possibility of multiple equilibria or hysteresis in default rates. Furthermore, our analysis does not
provide a forecast about the future path of stigma. Nevertheless, if the drop in stigma is due to a
reduction in social opprobrium or to an increase in information, it would most likely be difficult to
reverse. And if stigma in turn decreases with the number of people who have defaulted, future
recessions could ratchet up default rates.23
This analysis can be extended in a number of ways. First, the authors are attempting to
collect additional data to lengthen the sample period. Second, better predictors of default might be
constructed. Evidently the credit risk scores did not fully predict the recent increase in default
rates. Since variables other than the scores were also found to be significant in predicting default,
the scores might not even be efficient predictors. Better predictors might improve credit risk
management and lead to a more efficient allocation of credit. Further, the standard risk scores do
not summarize the expected future profitability of accounts. “Profit scores” might be constructed
to combine default probabilities with expected future cash flows. Third, because the estimated
stigma effect represents an increase in the probability of default that is common across accounts, it
would be interesting to examine its implications for portfolio diversification and securitization.
Fourth, in a companion paper, Gross and Souleles (1999), the authors are investigating more
generally how people use their credit cards, including how they respond to changes in credit
supply like credit limits and interest rates. Understanding why people accumulate large quantities
of debt in the first place should shed additional light on why some people default.24
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Fig. 1. The effects of account age (in months) and time on the probability of delinquency. Each
curve represents the hazard function for a different quarter.27















































































Table 2: Probit Models of Bankruptcy
This table shows the results of probit models of bankruptcy (BK) using monthly credit-card account panel
data from July 1995 through June 1997. The independent variables control for time effects, account age,
measures of account risk, and local economic conditions. quarter2 to quarter8 are dummy variables for
the calendar quarter.  age to  age
5 represent a fifth-order polynomial in account age.  utilization2 to
utilization7 are dummy variables for successively higher utilization rates. line is the credit limit, and
payments and purchases are normalized by the line. internal_score and external_score are the credit risk
scores. unemployment is the local unemployment rate, no_insure the fraction of people without health
insurance, and house_prices the median real new house price. Coefficients on dummy variables for the
issuer are not shown. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and dependence within





2 = internal_score* internal_score  /1000.
In the baseline specification in Column (1) the risk controls are all taken from month 0, June 1995.
Column (2) interacts the polynomial in account age with the risk controls. Only the coefficients on the
primary, non-interacted variables are shown. Column (3) uses the updated credit limit (once lagged).
Column (4) adds dummy variables for the cardholder's state, whose coefficients are not shown. staterate
in Column (5) is the aggregate bankruptcy rate in the state, averaged over the previous two calendar
quarters.
(1) (2) (3)
     baseline specification            interact with age               update credit line        
BK
coef. s.e. p-val coef. s.e. p-val coef. s.e. p-val
quarter2 0.141 0.052 0.007 0.159 0.053 0.003 0.142 0.052 0.007
quarter3 0.108 0.053 0.043 0.130 0.055 0.018 0.108 0.054 0.044
quarter4 0.220 0.055 0.000 0.246 0.057 0.000 0.221 0.055 0.000
quarter5 0.248 0.065 0.000 0.269 0.067 0.000 0.248 0.065 0.000
quarter6 0.250 0.066 0.000 0.266 0.068 0.000 0.251 0.066 0.000
quarter7 0.263 0.067 0.000 0.275 0.069 0.000 0.266 0.068 0.000
quarter8 0.293 0.069 0.000 0.307 0.070 0.000 0.297 0.069 0.000
age 0.079 0.049 0.106 -0.187 0.090 0.038 0.078 0.049 0.113
age
2 -0.486 0.282 0.084 -0.270 0.305 0.375 -0.472 0.282 0.095
age
3 1.339 0.735 0.068 1.428 0.764 0.062 1.292 0.736 0.079
age
4 -1.647 0.875 0.060 -1.635 0.904 0.070 -1.583 0.876 0.071
age
5 0.733 0.385 0.057 0.681 0.396 0.085 0.702 0.386 0.069
utilization2 0.087 0.084 0.297 0.080 0.087 0.355 0.095 0.084 0.259
utilization3 0.352 0.086 0.000 0.255 0.126 0.042 0.360 0.086 0.000
utilization4 0.335 0.093 0.000 0.203 0.149 0.174 0.344 0.093 0.000
utilization5 0.327 0.088 0.000 0.171 0.160 0.285 0.334 0.088 0.000
utilization6 0.544 0.084 0.000 0.365 0.171 0.033 0.549 0.084 0.000
utilization7 0.559 0.095 0.000 0.376 0.187 0.044 0.557 0.095 0.000
payments -1.228 0.451 0.006 -10.203 1.924 0.000 -1.253 0.460 0.006
purchases 0.195 0.172 0.256 1.443 0.723 0.046 0.185 0.172 0.283
line 3.74e-6 5.44e-6 0.491 -3.15e-5 2.22e-5 0.157 -8.10e-6 4.82e-6 0.093
internal_score -0.019 0.008 0.017 -0.020 0.008 0.013 -0.020 0.008 0.013
internal_score
2 0.011 0.006 0.053 0.005 0.006 0.381 0.012 0.006 0.041
external_score 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.020 0.004 0.000 0.018 0.004 0.000
external_score
2 -0.016 0.003 0.000 -0.016 0.003 0.000 -0.016 0.003 0.000
unemployment 5.970 1.603 0.000 5.601 1.624 0.001 6.127 1.604 0.00031
no_insurance 0.059 0.354 0.867 0.035 0.357 0.923 0.062 0.354 0.861
house_prices -2.38e-6 1.15e-6 0.038 -2.44e-6 1.15e-6 0.034 -2.26e-6 1.15e-6 0.048
# of obs 246749 246749 246749
log likelihood -3061.0 -3036.9 -3060.3
pseudo R2 0.127 0.134 0.128
Table 2 (cont)
(4) (5)
             state dummies                  state bankruptcy rate     
BK
coef. s.e. p-val coef. s.e. p-val
quarter2 0.140 0.053 0.008 0.130 0.052 0.013
quarter3 0.109 0.054 0.043 0.097 0.054 0.070
quarter4 0.222 0.056 0.000 0.192 0.056 0.001
quarter5 0.258 0.068 0.000 0.194 0.067 0.004
quarter6 0.258 0.069 0.000 0.186 0.069 0.007
quarter7 0.272 0.072 0.000 0.196 0.070 0.005
quarter8 0.302 0.077 0.000 0.216 0.073 0.003
age 0.076 0.049 0.122 0.080 0.049 0.105
age
2 -0.464 0.283 0.102 -0.487 0.283 0.086
age
3 1.272 0.739 0.085 1.324 0.738 0.073
age
4 -1.561 0.879 0.076 -1.609 0.878 0.067
age
5 0.692 0.387 0.074 0.708 0.387 0.067
utilization2 0.090 0.084 0.284 0.091 0.084 0.278
utilization3 0.348 0.085 0.000 0.354 0.086 0.000
utilization4 0.327 0.092 0.000 0.337 0.093 0.000
utilization5 0.328 0.088 0.000 0.330 0.088 0.000
utilization6 0.548 0.084 0.000 0.546 0.084 0.000
utilization7 0.554 0.095 0.000 0.560 0.095 0.000
payments -1.252 0.448 0.005 -1.258 0.455 0.006
purchases 0.219 0.168 0.194 0.196 0.170 0.250
line 6.62e-7 5.40-6 0.902 1.95e-6 5.45e-6 0.721
internal_score -0.019 0.008 0.019 -0.018 0.008 0.026
internal_score
2 0.011 0.006 0.058 0.010 0.006 0.074
external_score 0.018 0.004 0.000 0.018 0.004 0.000
external_score
2 -0.016 0.003 0.000 -0.016 0.003 0.000
unemployment 4.959 5.036 0.325 4.196 1.733 0.015
no_insurance -3.010 1.907 0.114 -0.002 0.366 0.995
house_prices 4.53e-6 1.10e-5 0.681 -1.23e-6 1.26e-6 0.326
staterate 1.00e+3 2.32e+2 0.000
staterate
2 -3.70e+5 9.38e+4 0.000
# of obs 246749 246749
log likelihood -3036.9 -3052.8
pseudo R2 0.134 0.13032
Table 3: Marginal Effects for Bankruptcy
Each column reports the marginal effects for the probit models in the corresponding column in Table 2,
as defined by Eqs. (2) and (3). stigmat shows the effect on bankruptcy rates of varying only the time
dummies across quarters t, relative to the first quarter. riskcompt shows the effect of varying account age
and the economic control variables across their cross-sectional averages in different quarters. The units
are in percentage points per month.






marginal s.e. marginal s.e. marginal s.e.
stigmat
  quarter1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
  quarter2 0.026% 0.010% 0.018% 0.007% 0.026% 0.010%
  quarter3 0.019% 0.010% 0.014% 0.006% 0.019% 0.010%
  quarter4 0.046% 0.013% 0.033% 0.009% 0.047% 0.014%
  quarter5 0.055% 0.018% 0.038% 0.012% 0.056% 0.018%
  quarter6 0.056% 0.018% 0.037% 0.012% 0.057% 0.019%
  quarter7 0.060% 0.019% 0.039% 0.013% 0.062% 0.020%
  quarter8 0.070% 0.021% 0.046% 0.014% 0.073% 0.022%
riskcompt
  quarter1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
  quarter2 0.001% 0.002% 0.004% 0.001% 0.001% 0.002%
  quarter3 0.000% 0.003% 0.007% 0.003% 0.000% 0.003%
  quarter4 -0.001% 0.004% 0.008% 0.003% -0.001% 0.004%
  quarter5 -0.015% 0.003% -0.002% 0.003% -0.016% 0.003%
  quarter6 -0.016% 0.003% -0.002% 0.003% -0.017% 0.004%
  quarter7 -0.017% 0.003% -0.003% 0.003% -0.018% 0.004%
  quarter8 -0.018% 0.004% -0.004% 0.004% -0.019% 0.004%
specification (4) state dummies (5) state
bankruptcy rate
marginal s.e. marginal s.e.
stigmat
  quarter1 0.000% 0.000%
  quarter2 0.023% 0.009% 0.022% 0.009%
  quarter3 0.017% 0.009% 0.016% 0.009%
  quarter4 0.042% 0.012% 0.037% 0.012%
  quarter5 0.052% 0.017% 0.038% 0.015%
  quarter6 0.052% 0.018% 0.036% 0.016%
  quarter7 0.056% 0.019% 0.038% 0.016%
  quarter8 0.066% 0.023% 0.044% 0.018%
riskcompt
  quarter1 0.000% 0.000%
  quarter2 0.001% 0.002% 0.002% 0.002%
  quarter3 0.000% 0.003% 0.002% 0.003%
  quarter4 -0.001% 0.003% 0.004% 0.004%
  quarter5 -0.014% 0.003% -0.009% 0.004%
  quarter6 -0.015% 0.003% -0.009% 0.004%
  quarter7 -0.016% 0.004% -0.010% 0.004%
  quarter8 -0.016% 0.004% -0.009% 0.005%33
Table 4: Probit Models of Delinquency
This table shows the results of probit models of delinquency (DEL) using monthly credit-card account
panel data from July 1995 through June 1997. The independent variables control for time effects, account
age, measures of account risk, and local economic conditions. quarter2 to quarter8 are dummy variables
for the calendar quarter. age to age
5 represent a fifth-order polynomial in account age. utilization2 to
utilization7 are dummy variables for successively higher utilization rates. line is the credit limit, and
payments and purchases are normalized by the line. internal_score and external_score are the credit risk
scores. unemployment is the local unemployment rate, no_insure the fraction of people without health
insurance, and house_prices the median real new house price. Coefficients on dummy variables for the
issuer are not shown. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and dependence within





2 = internal_score* internal_score  /1000.
In the baseline specification in Column (1) the risk controls are all taken from month 0, June 1995.
Column (2) interacts the polynomial in account age with the risk controls. Only the coefficients on the
primary, non-interacted variables are shown. Column (3) uses the updated credit limit (once lagged).
Column (4) adds dummy variables for the cardholder's state, whose coefficients are not shown. 
(1) (2) (3)
      baseline specification            interact with age               update credit line        
DEL
coef. s.e. p-val coef. s.e. p-val coef. s.e. p-val
quarter2 0.212 0.030 0.000 0.231 0.031 0.000 0.212 0.030 0.000
quarter3 0.254 0.032 0.000 0.277 0.033 0.000 0.257 0.032 0.000
quarter4 0.253 0.034 0.000 0.276 0.035 0.000 0.259 0.034 0.000
quarter5 0.308 0.038 0.000 0.327 0.039 0.000 0.316 0.038 0.000
quarter6 0.359 0.039 0.000 0.370 0.040 0.000 0.373 0.039 0.000
quarter7 0.297 0.041 0.000 0.305 0.041 0.000 0.317 0.041 0.000
quarter8 0.299 0.043 0.000 0.305 0.044 0.000 0.323 0.044 0.000
age 0.073 0.031 0.018 -0.093 0.055 0.089 0.075 0.031 0.015
age
2 -0.413 0.182 0.023 -0.175 0.196 0.371 -0.421 0.182 0.021
age
3 1.014 0.483 0.036 0.772 0.490 0.115 1.027 0.483 0.034
age
4 -1.114 0.583 0.056 -0.789 0.589 0.180 -1.122 0.583 0.054
age
5 0.445 0.260 0.086 0.292 0.261 0.264 0.446 0.260 0.086
utilization2 0.011 0.039 0.779 0.035 0.043 0.416 0.024 0.040 0.537
utilization3 0.042 0.044 0.330 0.107 0.067 0.114 0.056 0.044 0.202
utilization4 0.084 0.050 0.093 0.170 0.082 0.039 0.100 0.050 0.047
utilization5 0.030 0.046 0.510 0.123 0.088 0.164 0.043 0.046 0.354
utilization6 0.146 0.043 0.001 0.251 0.094 0.008 0.156 0.044 0.000
utilization7 0.203 0.052 0.000 0.322 0.105 0.002 0.208 0.053 0.000
payments -1.189 0.171 0.000 -4.286 1.215 0.000 -1.193 0.172 0.000
purchases 0.522 0.098 0.000 0.776 0.419 0.064 0.509 0.098 0.000
line -1.95e-5 4.19e-6 0.000 -4.51e-5 1.56e-5 0.004 -2.67e-5 3.76e-6 0.000
internal_score -0.020 0.005 0.000 -0.016 0.005 0.002 -0.021 0.005 0.000
internal_score
2 0.010 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.294 0.011 0.004 0.005
external_score 0.000 0.003 0.940 0.000 0.003 0.870 -0.001 0.003 0.810
external_score
2 -0.002 0.002 0.235 -0.002 0.002 0.239 -0.002 0.002 0.337
unemployment 0.210 1.120 0.851 -0.049 1.126 0.966 0.366 1.125 0.745
no_insurance 0.606 0.253 0.017 0.590 0.251 0.019 0.606 0.254 0.01734
house_prices 6.53e-7 7.49e-7 0.383 6.32e-7 7.46e-7 0.397 7.15e-7 7.53e-7 0.342
# of obs 367047 367047 367047
log likelihood -11990.8 -11961.2 -11971.7
pseudo R2 0.142 0.144 0.143
(4)
             state dummies        
DEL
coef. s.e. p-val
quarter2 0.217 0.030 0.000
quarter3 0.262 0.032 0.000
quarter4 0.262 0.035 0.000
quarter5 0.328 0.039 0.000
quarter6 0.378 0.041 0.000
quarter7 0.319 0.045 0.000
quarter8 0.322 0.051 0.000
age 0.068 0.031 0.027
age
2 -0.389 0.182 0.033
age
3 0.967 0.485 0.046
age
4 -1.072 0.586 0.067
age
5 0.430 0.261 0.099
utilization2 0.009 0.040 0.821
utilization3 0.038 0.044 0.389
utilization4 0.084 0.050 0.095
utilization5 0.030 0.046 0.513
utilization6 0.144 0.043 0.001
utilization7 0.205 0.053 0.000
payments -1.171 0.171 0.000
purchases 0.529 0.097 0.000
line -2.03e-5 4.29e-6 0.000
internal_score -0.020 0.005 0.000
internal_score
2 0.010 0.004 0.009
external_score 0.000 0.003 0.928
external_score
2 -0.003 0.002 0.172
unemployment 0.236 2.922 0.936
no_insurance -0.302 1.310 0.818
house_prices -1.26e-6 7.46e-6 0.865
# of obs 367047
log likelihood -11954.6
pseudo R2 0.14535
Table 5: Marginal Effects for Delinquency
Each column reports the marginal effects for the probit models in the corresponding column in Table 4,
as defined by Eqs. (2) and (3). stigmat shows the effect on delinquency rates of varying only the time
dummies across quarters t, relative to the first quarter. riskcompt shows the effect of varying account age
and the economic control variables across their cross-sectional averages in different quarters. The units
are in percentage points per month.






marginal s.e. marginal s.e. marginal s.e.
stigmat
  quarter1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
  quarter2 0.147% 0.022% 0.130% 0.019% 0.152% 0.022%
  quarter3 0.188% 0.027% 0.168% 0.024% 0.197% 0.027%
  quarter4 0.187% 0.029% 0.167% 0.025% 0.199% 0.030%
  quarter5 0.249% 0.038% 0.214% 0.033% 0.266% 0.040%
  quarter6 0.313% 0.045% 0.261% 0.038% 0.342% 0.048%
  quarter7 0.234% 0.040% 0.193% 0.034% 0.267% 0.044%
  quarter8 0.237% 0.044% 0.193% 0.036% 0.275% 0.048%
riskcompt
  quarter1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
  quarter2 -0.002% 0.004% 0.006% 0.003% -0.005% 0.004%
  quarter3 -0.008% 0.006% 0.008% 0.006% -0.014% 0.006%
  quarter4 -0.015% 0.007% 0.009% 0.007% -0.024% 0.007%
  quarter5 -0.055% 0.007% -0.021% 0.007% -0.065% 0.007%
  quarter6 -0.061% 0.007% -0.023% 0.008% -0.075% 0.008%
  quarter7 -0.066% 0.008% -0.025% 0.009% -0.083% 0.008%





  quarter1 0.000%
  quarter2 0.141% 0.022%
  quarter3 0.181% 0.028%
  quarter4 0.182% 0.030%
  quarter5 0.252% 0.041%
  quarter6 0.315% 0.050%
  quarter7 0.242% 0.047%
  quarter8 0.245% 0.055%
riskcompt
  quarter1 0.000%
  quarter2 -0.003% 0.004%
  quarter3 -0.009% 0.005%
  quarter4 -0.016% 0.007%
  quarter5 -0.054% 0.008%
  quarter6 -0.059% 0.009%
  quarter7 -0.064% 0.010%
  quarter8 -0.068% 0.011%36